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Hegelian Spirits in Sellarsian Bottles
Willem A. deVries
1. The received view is that analytic philosophy originated in Russell and Moore’s
reaction against the neoHegelian idealism that was dominant in late-19th century
British universities.  Ever since, Hegelianism has served as the Other over against which
analytic philosophy at least in part defines itself, not so much argued with as
disparaged and vilified.  But the “shape(s) of consciousness” analytic philosophy
embodies has generated a dialectic that brings it back to Hegelian insights.  Wilfrid
Sellars played a major role in this dialectic, which has been pushed further by later
members of what is sometimes called “Pittsburgh Hegelianism.”  Here I will address
the landmark Hegelian positions to be found in Sellars’s thought —  but also their
limits, the Hegelian territory that Sellars did not reclaim.  
2. Wilfrid Sellars portrays himself most often as an analytic Kantian, but clearly Sellars
is not a pure Kantian.  Sellars “corrects” Kant.  In many cases these corrections push him
in Hegel’s direction, but Sellars only occasionally points this out, I think for political
reasons.  Given the general disrepute of Hegelianism throughout Sellars’s publishing
career, identifying his own positions as Hegelian would have done them no good,
inducing many of the people he wanted to talk with to stop listening.  When I wrote my
dissertation on Hegel under Sellars’s supervision, he was never surprised when I
mentioned various points of confluence between Hegel’s thought and his own.  Sellars
Draft – Reading Version PAPA Page 2
was perfectly well aware of his own Hegelian leanings; he just did not trumpet them
publicly.  
3. However, the textual basis for the claim that Sellars was really a closeted Hegelian is
not so easy to make out.  Let me start with some prosaic textual points, because the
references to Hegel that Sellars does make are often misread.  Consider the
characterization of Sellars’s argument in EPM as “incipient Meditations Hegeliènnes”
(EPM §20; in SPR: 148; in KMG: 227).  This has been read as an acknowledgment of a
debt to Hegel.  But, in fact, these words are put into the mouth of a hypothetical logical
atomist and verge on an insult.  There is, of course, truth to it, but it is hardly a ringing
endorsement of Sellars’s Hegelian tendencies.  
4. There are several passages in SM that refer to Hegel (see SM I ¶40, ¶75; II ¶54; V ¶37;
VII ¶144).  They are a mixed bag.  The last one classifies Hegel as a great dialectician;
the penultimate reference to Hegel claims that the Hegelian tradition exploits the
flexibility in the use of abstract terms, but complains that it doesn’t explain it.  The first
three references to Hegel seem outright critical, but a careful look shows that the first
and the third are directly critical, not of Hegel himself, but of the Hegelian tradition, by
which Sellars mostly means British Neo-Hegelianism.  Only the second reference to
Hegel in SM, at SM I ¶75, is directly critical of Hegel for having, like Mill, ignored an
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important distinction that Kant did not actually draw, namely, the distinction between
the forms of receptivity proper and the forms of what is represented intuitively.
5. I will begin by analyzing the clearest text in which Sellars “goes Hegelian” (Section I). 
Given the paucity of further direct textual evidence, we must then move to a higher
level of analysis in identifying the Hegelian spirit in Sellars’s thought (Sections II & III). 
I will point out several dimensions along which Sellars was clearly closer to Hegel than
Kant.  Furthermore, Sellars departs from Kant in these ways, I think, for the right
reasons. 
6. Sellars moves from the Kantian to the Hegelian in at least these ways:
$ He recognizes that the normativity essential to intentionality is an essentially
social phenomenon and cannot be done justice to individualistically.
$ He recognizes the possibility (and reality) not just of conceptual change, but of
categorial change.
$ He denies a given that Kant assumes.
$ This is not a quietist position, but metaphysically ambitious and rigorously
realistic, that is, opposed to any form of subjective idealism.
I. Sociality
7.  Although some of Sellars’s references to Hegel are either indirect or subtly critical
when read closely, there is one in which Sellars flat out declares his allegiance to a
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Hegelian position.  In PSIM when Sellars rejects the “Robinson Crusoe conception of the
world as generating conceptual thinking directly in the individual” (PSIM ¶44, in SPR:
16; in ISR: 384), he writes,
It was not until the time of Hegel that the essential role of the group as a
mediating factor in this causation [of the presence in the individual of the
framework of conceptual thinking] was recognized, and while it is easy for us to
see that the immanence and transcendence of conceptual frameworks with
respect to the individual thinker is a social phenomenon, and to find a
recognition of this fact implicit in the very form of our image of man in the
world, it was not until the nineteenth century that this feature of the manifest
image was, however inadequately, taken into account (Ibid). 
8.  Notice that Sellars does not attribute this insight directly to Hegel, and rightly so,
since it was an accomplishment of postKantian Idealism generally.  Sellars also quickly
hedges his endorsement of the Hegelian insight with criticism:
The manifest image must, therefore, be construed as containing a conception of
itself as a group phenomenon, the group mediating between the individual and
the intelligible order. But any attempt to explain this mediation within the
framework of the manifest image was bound to fail, for the manifest image
contains the resources for such an attempt only in the sense that it provides the
foundation on which scientific theory can build an explanatory framework; and
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while conceptual structures of this framework are built on the manifest image,
they are not definable within it. Thus, the Hegelian, like the Platonist of whom he
is the heir, was limited to the attempt to understand the relation between
intelligible order and individual minds in analogical terms (PSIM ¶48, in SPR: 17;
in ISR: 385).
9.  It is standard Sellarsian doctrine that the manifest image generates questions it
cannot answer on its own, and this is an instance.  Even augmented with the Hegelian
insight that the community is an essential intermediary between the individual and the
intelligible order, the manifest framework, Sellars claims, is not in a position to explain
how the community serves this role.  This is a complex thought, so let’s pause to fill it
out.  First, we need to characterize the ‘intelligible order.’  It is the network of rational
connections among the concepts of a conceptual framework.1  Our confidence that
brothers are male siblings or that when cooled sufficiently, water turns to ice, is a
function of the fact that such connections get built in to our conceptual
framework/language.  
1It is also worth noting that Sellars would not think that rational connections among
concepts are always analytic or apriori.  Sellars makes room for material connections that are
nonetheless rational.  In general, Sellars thinks of rational connections, not on the containment
model that Kant employed, but as inference tickets, and then recognizes both formally and
materially valid inferences.
It is also worth remarking here that Sellars’s phrase “the intelligible order” implies a
unique referent.  But if the intelligible order is the set of rational connections among concepts,
then there will be, of course, many possible intelligible orders, since there are multiple possible
conceptual frameworks.  Sellars does seem to assume that we can sensibly posit a Peircean ideal
framework that, given world enough and time, we would be fated to accept.
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10.  At this point in PSIM, the general problem is, How do we come to grasp the rational
connections among the concepts of the manifest framework?  This is the context in
which Sellars discusses the relation between the ‘manifest image’ (the framework of
more-or-less commonsense concepts that we learn at momma’s knee and in terms of
which we experience the world) and classical philosophy, especially the Platonic
tradition.   Until the 19th century, the general idea philosophers worked with was that
we come to grasp the rational connections constitutive of the manifest image by means
of some action of the world upon individual minds.  According to Plato, for instance,
items in a separable intelligible order, the Forms, act upon us before birth to imprint
themselves on our minds; sensory experience, with a dose of dialectic, can re-awaken in
us our forgotten insight into the intelligible order.  What Western philosophers shared
until Hegel’s time is the conviction that “somehow the world [independently of social
mediation] is the cause of the individual’s image of the world” (PSIM ¶44, in SPR: 16; in
ISR: 384).  
11.  Furthermore, according to Sellars, “[i]n the Platonic tradition this mode of causation
is attributed to a being which is analogous, to a greater or lesser degree, to a person”
(ibid.).  Some examples:  The Platonic forms share the same kind of being as a human
psychç, which is why they can interact.  The Cartesian God that builds the innate ideas
into us is still conceived of as a personal God.  Hegel was a member in good standing of
the Platonic tradition, and thus also understood the relation between intelligible order
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and individual mind in terms of something person-like that accounts for how
individuals come to possess a conceptual framework.  But for Hegel this is not a matter
of direct efficient causal action of some person-like agency on the individual.  It is,
rather, a matter of Spirit informing the activity and pervading the being of the human
individual.  Spirit is not like an individual person, localized in space and time, nor is it
outside of space and time, but its fundamental structure is still that of a mind.  (It makes
sense to attribute ‘cunning’ to Spirit, for instance.)  Different interpretations of Hegel
cash out the personality of Spirit in different ways, but such details are not relevant
here. 
 
12.  Sellars’s view, however, is that the manifest image cannot explain how the
community (or Spirit) in fact mediates the individual’s acquisition of a conceptual
framework.   He says the most one could hope for from the manifest image in this
regard is to understand the relation between the individual and the intelligible order in
“analogical terms.”  This is a complex claim with both a negative and a positive
component.  The negative claim denies that the MI can explain how the community
mediates the individual’s acquisition of a conceptual framework.  Sellars gives us no
argument in PSIM for this negative claim.  The manifest image has shown itself to be a
flexible tool for coping with reality, capable of growth and development to
accommodate an ever richer understanding of the structure of reality and our relation
to it.  That Hegel and postKantian idealism, having finally reached the insight that the
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community is a necessary intermediary between individual and the intelligible order,
did not immediately develop a satisfactory explanatory theory of how that mediation
occurs is hardly surprising.  But we would need a positive argument to establish that
the manifest image cannot develop such an explanation.  
13. Sellars grants that the MI permits understanding the relation between the individual
and the intelligible order “in analogical terms.”  This sounds fairly dismissive, as if such
an understanding is something to be transcended.  In a sense, that’s what Sellars thinks,
but even if we manage to transcend this analogy-based understanding, it does not follow
that we should or even can discard it.  According to Sellars, our conceptions of
psychological states are developed in analogical terms, and Sellars never intimates that
future science will give us occasion to discard folk psychology, although some of
Sellars’s students have drawn that conclusion. Quite to the contrary, Sellars insists that
the language of “individual and community intentions” — the very heart of the
manifest image — must be joined or added to, reconstructed, or better, preserved
within the future scientific image.2  Refining the language of community intentions —
the language of sociology, social psychology, family life, and politics — has been on the
agenda since Hegel. But Sellars thinks there is a limit to the progress that can be made
2I have argued that preservation of the “language of individual and community
intentions” in the scientific image (as opposed to mere ‘joining’) is the proper conception in
several places: “Ontology and the Completeness of Sellars's Two Images,” Humana.Mente -
Journal of Philosophical Studies 21:1-18 (2012),
[http://www.humanamente.eu/PDF/Issue_21_Paper_deVries.pdf], and “Images, Descriptions,
and Pictures:  Personhood and the Clash,” forthcoming.
Draft – Reading Version PAPA Page 9
in these directions with armchair methodologies, just as there is with refining folk
psychology.
14.   Science always begins with analogically formulated concepts and then reconstructs,
refines, and extends them until they become well-specified concepts within a new and
independently grounded empirical discipline. Modern science, in Sellars’s view, is
beginning to give us access in such non-metaphoric concepts to how individual
organisms acquire and use concepts and the rational connections among them.  We
have already overcome some false steps:  “this causal role cannot be equated with a
conditioning of the individual by his environment in a way which could in principle
occur without the mediation of the family and the community” (ibid.).  But we also
have a positive program that holds great promise, for we are now in a position “to see
this as a matter of evolutionary development as a group phenomenon” and “incapable
of explanation in terms of a direct conditioning impact of the environment on the
individual as such” (PSIM ¶49, in SPR: 17; in ISR: 385).
15.  Evolution generates categorially new objects.  The case has become overwhelming
that the concepts initially developed to comprehend objects are themselves products of
evolution.  Ruth Millikan has shown how such processes can be accommodated within
a generally Sellarsian view.3  Still, as systematic as he was, one of the great lacks in
3Ruth Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories: New Foundations
for Realism.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1984. 
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Sellars’s philosophy is a treatment of the social sciences.  How to accommodate 
normatively-constituted social phenomena within the causal structures central to
science’s concerns is a daunting challenge.  But the idea that the complex and dynamic
conceptual structures we find crucial to understanding the world around us might be
grounded in equally complex and dynamic socio-historical causal structures points to a
vision that would unify central notions of the German Idealists with a naturalistic world
view.  This is, to my mind, an instructive example:  however much of the Hegelian wine
Sellars preserves, he is persistent in re-bottling it in naturalistic flasks.
II.  Realism, Metaphilosophy, and Categorial Change
16.  That Sellars adopts Hegel’s view of the sociality of concepts and the minds that
wield them, even though he transposes this insight into a naturalistic key, is relatively
low-hanging fruit.  Identifying other Hegelian theses in Sellars’s philosophy requires a
more complex analysis, for one cannot pull directly on Sellars’s own pronouncements.  
One method is to compare Sellars’s and Hegel’s critiques of Kant.  Sellars and Hegel
were convinced that, as undeniably profound and insightful as Kant’s philosophy is, it
also goes profoundly wrong in some ways.  Comparing Hegel and Sellars can teach us
much here. 
17.  I am going to attack the remaining three shared themes I mentioned earlier in
reverse order, for the master idea Sellars and Hegel share in relation to Kant is the
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rejection of Kant’s notion of the thing-in-itself.  This commitment drives the other
changes they introduce into Kant’s basic structure.   The conceptions Hegel and Sellars
possess of the true nature of things in themselves are radically different, of course.  But
for all their differences, they share a common strategy in their response to Kant.
18.  The analyses Hegel and Sellars offer of Kant’s arguments for transcendental
idealism are complex, further complicated by the fact that neither wants to reject
altogether the distinction between phenomenal reality and things as they are in
themselves.  Though Sellars casts his contra-Kantian proposal in terms of one large
distinction between the phenomenal and the real, or as he calls them, the manifest and
the scientific images,4 Hegel provides for numerous phenomenal realities related in
ways that require a phenomenology to understand.  It is not the distinction between
phenomenon and reality itself that Hegel and Sellars attack, but the notion that it is
absolute, establishing an unbridgeable divide.5 
18.  Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism turn crucially on the status of space
and time.  It is because, in Kant’s view, space and time can only be subjective conditions
of human receptivity that phenomenal spatio-temporal experience cannot reveal the
nature of things as they are in themselves.  This belief, in turn, is connected to Kant’s
4This is overly simple.  Sellars also mentions the “original image,” a forebear of the
manifest image.  Nor does Sellars think that the manifest image is itself unchanging.
5It is notable that attacking the absoluteness of familiar philosophical distinctions is a
standard move for pragmatists.
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belief that the distinction between the apriori and the aposteriori is itself absolute.  Kant is
convinced that there can be no inferences from the nature of our spatio-temporal
experience to the determinate nature or structure of things in themselves, because we
have pure, apriori knowledge of the fundamental structure of space and time, and this is
possible only if space and time are entirely independent of things in themselves.  
19.  Both Sellars and Hegel reject the notion that space and time can be only subjective
conditions of human receptivity.  They also reject the idea that the distinction between
the apriori and the aposteriori is clean and absolute.   Instead, we have degrees of
empirical sensitivity.6  This move disarms Kant’s principal arguments for
transcendental idealism, but it also transforms one’s understanding of the philosophical
project.  It does not force us to abandon the idea that philosophy could be or become a
science, but it does transform our conception of what that might mean and how
philosophy relates to other sciences.  It moves us significantly towards pragmatism, a
more thorough holism, and, as we’ll see, naturalism, because it means that there is no
level of abstraction at which thought can leave natural reality behind.  In my view, these
are all salient improvements on Kant. 
20.  For Hegel, space and time are “mere forms” (see Enc. §254; §448), namely, the forms
of the self-external, which can pertain both to certain contents of internal experiential
6I argue for this interpretation of Hegel in Hegel’s Theory of Mental Activity (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1988) (HTMA), Chapter 3. 
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states and to external, physical objects.7  Hegel grants that space and time are forms of
intuition, which sounds Kantian, but he does not think that being a form of intuition
disqualifies space and time from applying to things as they are in themselves.  The
forms of self-externality can apply both to internal representational states and simple
material objects and events.  As far as I can tell, Hegel did not work out in any detail
exactly what the relation is between the space-time that informs internal
representational states and the space-time that informs external, physical objects.  
Complications arise, however, from Hegel’s conception of sensation, which he
acknowledges to be a lower-level precursor of intuition that we share with animals. 
Animals have no metric and do not do geometry, but space and time have to be present
in sensation in some immediate way, lest it be impossible to understand how animals
can maneuver in space and to some extent even in time (e.g., in animal planning and
memory).  But Hegel did not work out in any detail exactly how space and time show
up in sensation.
21.  Sellars worries about such matters.  He proposes that Kant needs to distinguish the
forms of sensibility strictly so-called, which would pertain to "the characteristics of the
representations of receptivity as such"(SM, I ¶77: 30) (i.e., sensations), from the space
and time in which our conceptual representations (including intuition) locate their
objects. That is, Sellars thinks Kant needs to distinguish better between the structure of
7See my discussion of the status of space and time in Hegel in HTMA: 111-116.
Draft – Reading Version PAPA Page 14
sensory representings and the structure of sensory representeds.  This move becomes
crucial to Sellars's own attempt to transcend transcendental idealism and defend the
realism he always espoused, for it supports the claim that whatever the particular
formal characteristics of the representations (representings) of receptivity as such, the
(corrected and conceptualized) space and time in which we locate the objects (the
representeds) of our conceptual experience are by no means subjective and dependent
on "brute-fact features of our subjectivity."
22.  That is, Sellars exploits the fact that the organization of sensory experiencings may
exhibit a structure that is abstractly and generically similar to the structure of physical
objects and events, but not strictly and determinately identical to it.  Of course, Sellars
denies that we can just “read off” our  concept of space and time from the properties and
relations of our sensory states—that would be a naïve givenism.  As the structure of the
responses to wordly events encoded in our sensory states congeals into complex
patterns that we eventually come to be able to characterize reflectively and ultimately
endorse, reject, or revise, we develop concepts of space, time, and spatio-temporal
properties as they exist objectively in the world.  With sufficient sophisticated empirical
research we can develop, starting from the conception of space and time we ‘naturally’
develop in response to the structure of sensory experiencings, a much more refined and
grounded conception of the space and time of physical objects.  Only at a much later
stage in the development of the human sciences can we return to investigating in detail
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the nature of the properties and relations of our representings themselves and how they
fit into the objective organization of the world represented. 
23.  That the spatio-temporality of experience need not cut us off from things as they are
in themselves does not yet provide us with a positive reason to assert that we are not so
cut off.  We need a different argument to entitle us to the beliefs (1) that the space and
time of our subjective experience actually does not separate us from things as they are
in themselves; (2) that there is an objective space and time in which things exist
independently of subjective cognition, and (3) that we have the wherewithal to cognize
such things and the space and time in which they exist.
24.  Despite the many differences between Hegel and Sellars in their approach to these
challenges, I think there is a fundamental similarity in their strategy.8   The strategy,
boiled down, is this:  Kant assumes a number of basic dualisms, apriori/aposteriori,
analytic/synthetic, subjective/objective, receptivity/spontaneity, even empirical
science/philosophy.  Kant’s enterprise of critical philosophy is formulated in terms of
these dualisms.   But Hegel insists that, trapped in these dualisms, Kant cannot
satisfactorily explain human cognition or action.  The gaps imposed by the assumed
dualisms never get properly bridged or closed.  Hegel therefore reconceives the critical
8Let me note here that I have found Sally Sedgewick’s analysis in Hegel’s Critique
of Kant: From Dichotomy to Identity, Oxford University Press, 2012, very helpful.
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project.  As Sedgewick describes Hegel’s reaction to one of the dualisms that rule Kant’s
conception of critique, 
[Hegel] calls into question the assumption that we can absolutely separate out
our meta-level reflections on the conditions of the possibility of some science or
realm of inquiry from the norms that govern the actual practice of the science or
realm of inquiry.  He, in other words, doubts that we can undertake critique from
an Archimedean point, from a standpoint of absolute ‘independence from
common reality’ (FK 63/GW 296) (Sedgewick: 150).
Rather than beginning with dualisms and seeking to explain how we can be at home in
a divided world, Hegel abandons rigid dualisms and recognizes that human life is a
dynamic, fallible enterprise that begins from relative ignorance (even of ourselves), is
fraught with contradictions to be overcome, and works itself slowly via constant
revision towards an ever more adequate grasp of and fittedness to the reality within
which (as opposed to over against which) we live.  The distinctions that arise must be
explained, not assumed.  Beginning from the original identity of subjective and
objective and seeking to account for the categorial distinctions that seem to confront us
as if eternally fixed in place at very least shifts the burden of proof.  If we do not begin
with starkly dualistic assumptions, the need for or reasonableness of a belief in
unknowable things in themselves never forces itself upon us.
25.  Sellars’s strategy in his response to Kant is strikingly similar, for Sellars also
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recognizes that there is no Archimedean point outside of common reality from which
the critic can operate.  He also rejects absolute, hard and fast dualisms in favor of
limited and pragmatically justified distinctions. Following Paul Redding, we can
describe one commonality between Hegel and Sellars, as opposed to Kant, as a
thoroughgoing rejection of both an exogenous and an endogenous given.  That is,
neither empirical content nor conceptual scheme are fixed deliverances without need of
further justification.  (Though this does not mean Sellars abjures all talk of Archimedean
points—something to which we shall return.)  But if conceptual form is not given
independently of the real world it confronts, there is little reason to think that it is
related only contingently to that world and affords us a mode of access to it unrelated to
what that world is in itself.  In Sellars’s view, as well as Hegel’s, human life is a
dynamic, fallible enterprise that begins from relative ignorance (even of ourselves), is
fraught with contradictions to be overcome, and works itself slowly via constant
revision towards an ever more adequate grasp of and fittedness to the reality within
which (as opposed to over against which) we live. 
26.  Kant’s distinction between transcendental realism and transcendental idealism
assumes that there is a clear line between the internal structures of a limited and
receptive subjectivity, which are knowable apriori, and the external or objective entities
that ultimately affect such a subjectivity.  Because they can, apparently in Kant’s view,
vary independently of each other, the best we can do in empirical cognition is to grasp a
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merely phenomenal reality.  Both Hegel and Sellars believe, in contrast, that subject and
object are correlative and cannot be understood fully independently of each other. We
may begin by grasping the world as it appears to us, but since neither an exogenous nor
an endogenous given dictates a limit on our inquiries, a stopping point behind which
we cannot go, it is possible to get behind appearances and come to understand the
underlying unity of ourselves and the world in itself. 
27. But that does not mean that the distinction between realism and idealism also
evaporates.  It remains a significant question what the fundamental reality of the world
is, one on which Hegel and Sellars take opposed positions.  The identity of subjective
and objective that Hegel begins from (and ends up with) is a spiritual identity, an
identity of Spirit; the identity of subjective and objective that Sellars begins from (and
ends up with) is a material identity.   Hegel’s absolute idealism, as an ontology, ends up
(like Sellars) endorsing epistemological realism; there is certainly no tincture of
subjective idealism in his final view, for the intelligible order is the real order, and the
real order is the intelligible order.  
III. The Unity of Things
28.  So let me finish with a few words about the fundamental identities that Hegel and
Sellars, respectively, think underlie the many distinctions that articulate the structure of
the world in which we live.  For Hegel, the underlying reality of the world is Spirit,
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though getting a proper grip on the nature of Spirit is itself no easy task.  Spirit is a
synthetic unity of a manifold of disparate items, each of which finds its true nature in
playing its role in the synthetic unity that is Spirit.  Hegel has abandoned the prejudice
against teleology that characterized most early modern thinkers, reviving the
Aristotelian conception.  Furthermore, he takes the Kantian notion of the mind as an
activity of synthesis productive of objects and applies it across the board — not only to
the activity of subjective minds constituting the objects of their experience, but to the
constitution of such objects as exist, as they do, independently of any individual
subjectivity.  To paraphrase Kant, the same function which gives unity to the various
representings in our mind also gives unity to the synthesis of various representeds in
the world.   The (capital-C) Concept and all the subordinate concepts that contribute to
it are the rules guiding such synthesis, and must themselves be uncovered in the
process of that synthesis.  This logical realism is a form of spiritualizing nature, and it is
important to Hegel that nature is not, ultimately, set over against Spirit, but enfolded
within Spirit as one mode in which spirit necessarily expresses itself.  
29.  Sellars, as one might guess, turns all this on its head.  Rather than spiritualizing
nature, he naturalizes spirit or mind, but not by a conceptual reduction defining mind in
terms of physical objects and properties.  Rather, minds or persons are high-order
patterns of activity within the physical world that respond to themselves and each other
as persons, members of a community that recognize and act upon norms that regulate
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their activities.  The forms of organization and activity evident in higher animals and
especially humans call for different forms of description and explanation from those
necessary for the description of the ‘merely’ physical or low-grade biological.  Perhaps
even more important, such creatures can take a first-person stance towards the world,
recognizing both their knowledge and its limitations, and formulating and executing
intentions, both singular ‘I’-intentions and plural ‘we’-intentions, thereby imposing a
greater order on their world than it would otherwise exhibit.  
30.  For Sellars, the intelligible order arises within the real or physical order.  It is a
creation of the habits and practices we engage in, especially our linguistic practices and
the forms of activity that the development of language enables.  Through language we
are able to transcend the immediacies of the moment by recognizing larger patterns and
responding to them in complex ways, adjusting our behavior, both cognitive and
practical, to the world we make as well as the world we find.  The dialectical
development of our concepts is not, in Sellars’s view (unlike Hegel’s), the very
heartbeat of the world itself.  But the intelligible order must nonetheless be tied to the
real order.  Semantical ‘relations’ cannot themselves do this job, given Sellars’s
treatment of them as functional classifiers of items in a language-like system.  Sellars
posits two points of ‘contact’ between the intelligible and the real orders.  The first is a
Peircean conception of absolute truth, a regulative ideal in which language and
representation are so adjusted to the world that nothing surprises or destabilizes them. 
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This is a contact between the intelligible and the real that is to-be-achieved; it is a task,
not yet an actuality.  The second is Sellars’s notion of picturing, a naturalistic relation
between (1) a special class of linguistic items (elementary sentences used in a reporting
role), conceived of in terms of their natural rather than their normative or semantic
properties, and (2) items in the real order.   That language-in-use pictures the world is,
in Sellars’s view, a transcendental condition of the intentional order’s properly
engaging the real order.  This is the “Archimedeian point outside the series of actual
and possible beliefs in terms of which to define the ideal or limit to which members of
this series might approximate” (SM V ¶75: 142; in the Ridgeview printing: 126). Both of
these forms of connection between the intelligible and the real orders need substantial
explication.  But that is a task for another day (or two or three).  
31. So I leave you with the remark that Hegel and Sellars are both, in the end, monistic
visionaries who try to explicate how it is possible for finite subjectivities to grasp the
reality around them as it is in itself.   No distinctions are primitive givens for them; each
distinction must be justified, for, in the end, the world is One. 
